The Quiet Politics of Lebanese Nigerians

Lebanese

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: Gilbert R. Chagoury receives the Igihango medal from President Kagame, 2017. PAUL KAGAME / FLICKR.

the ministry of memories

The Quiet Politics of Lebanese Nigerians

The Lebanese in Nigeria form one of the country’s most dynamic diaspora communities, with a fascinating history marked by notable commercial success and subtle political influence.
Lebanese

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: Gilbert R. Chagoury receives the Igihango medal from President Kagame, 2017. PAUL KAGAME / FLICKR.

the ministry of memories

The Quiet Politics of Lebanese Nigerians

The Lebanese in Nigeria form one of the country’s most dynamic diaspora communities, with a fascinating history marked by notable commercial success and subtle political influence.

In May 2024, the appointment of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s son, Seyi Tinubu, to the board of directors of companies owned by the renowned Lebanese-Nigerian business tycoon, Gilbert Chagoury, was publicized. The news generated considerable critical attention, particularly from those on the other side of the Nigerian presidency’s ‘political divide’. In the preceding month, Chagoury, known for his ownership of Hitech and long-standing business ties with President Tinubu, had been awarded the lucrative contract for the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway project. This appointment and the awarding of the contract have sparked widespread accusations of nepotism and corruption.

President Tinubu’s long-standing relationship with Chagoury, the poorly planned demolition of the Landmark Beach area in Lagos, and the controversial awarding of the Coastal Highway project, have led some observers to tentatively raise the question of whether this is an instance of ‘state capture’. This denotes a form of systematic political corruption where state decision-making processes are subordinated to private rather than national interests, sidelining democratic institutions. The news has also ignited a flurry of questions around the wider Lebanon-Nigeria relationship and the dominant influence of Lebanese figures like Chagoury in Nigeria.

Nigeria has been home to a remarkable Lebanese presence since the latter half of twentieth century—particularly in the vibrant cosmopolitan cities of Kano, Lagos and Ibadan. Many migrants—having actively established and sustained a significant commercial presence—have become Nigerian citizens, often mastering various Nigerian languages while retaining their distinct Lebanese-Arab cultural roots. They are today known as Lebanese Nigerians.

TWO STATES CONVERGING AND DIVERGING

Both Lebanon and Nigeria arguably face similar economic and political challenges and share a history of European colonization, as well as a baseline religious complexion of dominant Christian and Islamic groups. Yet the differences between the two countries are striking. Lebanon’s small population of around 5 million is predominantly Arab, though featuring notable Armenian and Greek minority groups. By contrast, Nigeria ranks among the world’s top ten most populous countries with over 220 million people and hundreds of ethno-linguistic groups.

Economically, Nigeria stands out as Africa’s leading oil exporter and one of the world’s largest oil producers—and also boasts vast arable lands cultivating a range of grains, fruits, and vegetables; as well as extensive mineral resources. Lebanon, despite being situated in the Middle East, produces little to no oil and has limited arable land, primarily confined to fruit production (olives, grapes, figs, almonds, apples, apricots, plums, cherries, etc.).

Despite its position as a relatively small state in the region, Lebanon has invested in its global diplomacy, including establishing diplomatic relations with 15 West African states. Nigeria has similarly established diplomatic ties with most Middle Eastern states (including Lebanon). The formal diplomatic relationship between Lebanon and Nigeria began in 1962, two years after Nigeria first gained independence.

TRACING THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP

Although the Lebanese presence in Nigeria became more visible in the latter half of the twentieth century, the migration trajectory predates Nigeria’s ‘formation’ or the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates in 1914. It reportedly began in the late 19th century with the arrival of Ilyas al-Khuri, a Maronite from Miziara in northern Lebanon in the 1890s. Other early migrants, such as Assad Yusuf and Ilyas Minaise, also stood out as early economic migrants traversing in search of a better life. Reports indicate that Lebanese families primarily began emigrating from the villages of Miziara and Jwaya after Ilyas al-Khuri settled in Lagos.

Several lines of enquiry arise from this history. Why did these Lebanese migrants choose to migrate to what later became Nigeria—particularly during a period when it was a relatively unknown British colonial protectorate? What characterizes the commercial and politico-economic dynamics of Lebanese migration to Nigeria? And what continues to pull Lebanese migrants to settle in Nigeria today? These questions have been subject to much scholarly attention, including by political scientist Bayly Winder in his 1962 article on the Lebanese in West Africa and Nigerian historian Toyin Falola in his 1990 article entitled Lebanese Traders in Southwestern Nigeria, 1900-1960.

Peculiarly, it has been suggested by scholars that some migrants may have in fact intended to reach America but were deceived by shipping agents in Marseilles, ending up on ships bound for Dakar or St. Louis in Senegal. Others may have knowingly headed towards West Africa, unable to meet the strict criteria for United States (US) migration or lacking sufficient funds to cross the Atlantic. Having collected funds from their often-poor families in the hope of sending back remittances upon reaching the ‘New World’, they were not ready to return home empty-handed.

Falola has also highlighted poverty, the quest for survival, underdevelopment, as well as political and religious tensions as factors driving early Lebanese migrants. He argues that—rather than their arrival in West Africa being an accident—these originally US-destined migrants, having transited already in Marseille and Egypt, were rather deliberately detoured and attracted to West Africa due to inexpensive fares and ease of entry, having no need for a passport at the time.

shop the republic

shop the republic

THE ENDURING MIGRATORY APPEAL

Whether by accident or design, the Lebanese diaspora in Nigeria stood at an estimated 6,000 people by the time of Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960: a significant number at the time. These Lebanese populations resided in differing numbers across several of Nigeria’s major cities—including Lagos (1,500), Kano (1,000), Ibadan (500), Jos (300), Zaria (200)—as well as many other cities such as Gusau, Sokoto, Maiduguri, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Calabar, Benin, and Kaduna, with numbers ranging between 20 and 100.

These populations have continued to grow through the settlement of descendants and subsequent waves of new arrivals. Some individuals are now fourth-generation Lebanese-Nigerians—and in February 2022, the Nigerian government under President Muhammadu Buhari granted citizenship to 108 Lebanese individuals. This persisting migratory trend underscores Nigeria’s enduring appeal as a desirable destination for Lebanese migrants.

So why do the Lebanese continue to find Nigeria attractive, particularly amid Nigeria’s recent economic struggles? Many are incentivized by the success of long-established Lebanese businesses by earlier migrants. Tatiana Mousalli Nouri, for instance—a fourth-generation Lebanese—oversees a family conglomerate including broadcasting companies, set up by her great-grandfather who arrived in Nigeria in the late 19th century—interestingly originally intending to migrate to Brazil.

Stories like Tatiana’s and those of many other prosperous Lebanese migrants in Nigeria, are also likely to further attract more Lebanese—whether from other intermediary countries or from Lebanon itself, which faces political instability and cross-border conflicts with Syria and Israel. Many Lebanese Nigerians also hold multiple citizenships, retaining their Lebanese nationality while holding passports from other countries such as the UK.

The Lebanese Nigerian community—like many diaspora communities elsewhere—are marked by tight-knit networks that have enabled and sustained their overriding commercial successes. Research conducted by Peter Adebayo between 2000 and 2008 across cities such as Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Port Harcourt, and Calabar—as well as in the Lebanese villages of Miziara and Jwaya—found that 80 per cent of Lebanese Nigerians rely on a communal support system of family members, friends, and business contacts for their various enterprises.

These commercial activities span trading, transport, mining, import-export businesses, manufacturing, and media. Today, they own successful enterprises across Nigeria, with the most notable being the Chagoury Group, including subsidiaries like South Energyx Nigeria Ltd and Hitech Construction. Their strategic investments also span multiple sectors, including Seven Up Bottling PLC, Moukarim Industries, Eko Hotels Ltd, and AIM Group Ltd. They additionally maintain substantial investments in hospitality and the textile industry, particularly in Kano and Lagos.

CONTRADICTIONS AND COMPLEXITIES

While Lebanese migrants in Nigeria have received considerable attention, the same cannot be said for Nigerian migrants in Lebanon, despite them numbering around 5,000 in population. The limited narrations of their experiences are conversely overwhelmingly bleak. In May 2020, over 50 trafficked Nigerian women were rescued from Lebanon and returned to Nigeria after a Nigerian maid was put up for sale on Facebook for $1,000. The United Nations revealed in 2022 that thousands of African women, including Nigerians, are trafficked to Lebanon each year.

This disparity in the relative experiences of Nigerians and Lebanese in their differential contexts is under-studied—but on the surface, it can at least be gathered that the dire economic conditions, political turmoil, and lack of opportunities that have historically driven the Lebanese to seek better lives abroad, may also deter Nigerians from migrating to Lebanon. There is also no evidence of Nigerians holding dual Lebanese citizenship, unlike many Lebanese who hold dual Nigerian citizenship.

Additionally, while it is important to recognize the instances of outsized commercial successes among Lebanese Nigerians, it is equally vital not to generalize. For example, although their numbers have decreased, many Lebanese in Kano largely engage in menial retail businesses in Kwari Market or run small to medium-sized restaurants. This speaks to the diversity of personal and professional occupations and circumstances among the diaspora community.

shop the republic

shop the republic

shop the republic

shop the republic

GENDER AND POWER

In Áfàméfùnà, while men are depicted as heirs and legacy bearers, women are relegated to roles that affirm their dependency. This portrayal mirrors and potentially exacerbates the societal undervaluing of women’s economic contributions. When Afam visits Odogwu as an independent man, Odogwu proposes marriage between Afam and Amaka. Like Amaka, the acceptable pathway through which women may attain status is marriage with successful men if they are lucky. 

Áfàméfùnà conveniently ignores all the ways that power intersects with gender, our traditions, and class relations. Amaka, as Odogwu’s daughter, is never imbued with the traditional powers an oga’s child would have over servants. She is introduced as an object to be desired and then is presented as a tool that Paulo uses, first as a lover and, perhaps more importantly, a foolish thief. Odogwu advises Afam to be wary of women notoriously framed as harbingers of men’s destruction, yet he fails to protect his daughter from the men with whom he has filled his home. 

Amaka is archetypal in the most powerless way: amorous, idealistic, passive, snivelling, and forlorn, with an identity positioned by the men around her. On the one hand, she is not the diabolical Nigerian wife sliding sons into legitimacy with a sly sleight of hand that the manosphere insists is the average Nigerian woman. Instead, she is devoid of actionable will to deprive her husband of certain paternity and the continuation of his lineage. She is ignorant about her actions, not having the foresight (or hindsight) to take care of the implications of sexual relations with her ex-boyfriend Paulo. We have no idea what Amaka studied at university or her professional ambitions. The dialogue points to her helping out her husband’s business. Her character acknowledges the career gap many women who are bred to be wives experience. 

This hierarchy of genders that begins within family units with plans for the future economic emancipation of boys while girls remain afterthoughts presents constraints for women who want to or have to provide for themselves and their families. Where access to funding and mentorship is generally limited for many women, they are especially determined or sealed in marriage. What are the economic limitations placed on women once they are married? How are husbands partnering with wives to ease the labour responsibilities at home, which women often shoulder alone? The influence of religious teachings and the irony of the chokehold that patriarchal leanings have to interpellate women into believing their status as second-tier members of society and, in turn, culturally reproduce offspring who continue to place a premium on boys as ‘heirs’ and daughters as ‘helpers’ mean that changing these social norms will be hard-fought. 

Despite women accounting for 64 per cent of registrants in the national apprenticeship scheme in 2018, significant barriers prevent them from forming robust business networks similar to those of men. While organizations like Women in Management, Business, and Public Service (WIMBIZ) provide networking platforms for classed Nigerian women, the majority of underprivileged women, who are often relegated to serving others as an economic means, face substantial restrictions in exercising their agency. 

The core issue lies in the socio-economic structures that underpin all social relations. These structures revolve around the acknowledgement, exhibition, and wielding of power. Marriage, the smallest political unit, exemplifies this dynamic where financial dominance is crucial. Within this framework, men are encouraged and often expected to be financially superior to their wives, reinforcing their dominant position in the household. This expectation influences all other aspects of their relationships, limiting women’s economic independence and capacity to form influential business networks. 

Underprivileged women, in particular, are often constrained by societal norms and economic policies that devalue their labour and restrict their opportunities. These women face significant obstacles in securing the mentorship, credit, and networks necessary for creating and sustaining successful businesses. Thus, the disparity in business networking opportunities is not due to a lack of initiative but is a consequence of deeply entrenched power imbalances. 

Gender hierarchies in marriage are exacerbated by financial dominance, closely tied to perceptions of masculinity. Women who challenge this norm by outearning their partners are perceived as stepping outside their femininity and emasculating their spouses. Autonomy and decision-making, particularly regarding one’s body, are linked to economic dominance but regulated by socio-cultural norms. As a result, even when women out-earn their partners, they often feel compelled to defer to their husbands, acknowledging them as the rightful ‘head’ of the household, exposing how tools can be useless in bound hands. Economic freedom is not very liberating for many women constrained by societal expectations of femininity. Despite achieving financial independence, these women often remain bound by cultural norms that dictate traditional gender roles and behaviours, limiting their ability to exercise their autonomy fully.  

The film’s crux and fulcrum of tension is Paulo’s blackmail of Afam. Its introductory scenes include the finding of Paulo’s corpse followed by a celebratory scene where Afam is dancing with his son. 

Perhaps women’s only power over men has always been the assurance of their parentage over children. This has been a recent hot-button topic in the Nigerian social media public sphere, with many calling for mandatory DNA tests to be administered at birth, a testament to modern heterosexual relations. 

Áfàméfùnà, the name, is a plea that reveals the fear of the loss of legacy and continuity—a uniquely male trepidation. It is a name pregnant with the concept of sons as bearers of legacies, heirs, bloodlines, or lineage, exposing the stereotypical Igbo reputation for the preference of male children. Even though this preference is almost global, stories that early Nollywood chose to highlight have cemented the idea as singularly Igbo in the consciousness of Nigerian audiences.  

The film emasculates Afam in the eyes of the audience by choosing to disempower him through his progeny. My audience analysis of five Igbo men revealed that men viewed Afam as a ‘simp’. One man suggested that marrying Amaka immediately was enough to make Afam fall into this category. For the other four, though, it was okay and even macho to ‘acquire’ her directly from Paulo. However, they all drew the line at accepting the fruit of that acquisition. 

SILENT BUT OUTSIZED POLITICAL INFLUENCE?

The Lebanese Nigerian community have made attempts to engage in politics since pre-independence Nigeria, primarily to protect their commercial interests. Initially, many worked within the colonial administration, then later began deepening their engagement in party politics, including by establishing the ‘Oriental’ wing of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in Kano. Lebanese individuals also participated in state-level politics across different parts of Nigeria during various periods of civilian rule, including in Kano and Jigawa. The community has however largely maintained a low profile in politics, likely due to fears of ostracization and discrimination.

Allegations around potential ‘capture’ associated with the Chagoury family are likely to cloud a wider culture of quiet political involvement and network-leveraging among the Lebanese Nigerian community—particularly in a Nigerian state so heavily influenced by patronage, numbers, ethnicity, religion, and other dominant cleavages—yet this is notably understudied. It would be worthy to explore whether there is any systematic usage of politico-commercial connections to secure government favours, lucrative contracts and tax waivers—and look further afield at concrete experiences of reported ‘state capture’ (such as in South Africa under former President Zuma). 

The Lebanese Nigerian community boasts a unique and rich history in Nigeria, a country they have come to call home over many generations. Their well-established presence is marked by remarkable commercial successes that have endured and evolved over time—despite Nigeria’s stubborn economic and security challenges. The Chagoury scandal has however sharpened the spotlight on how Lebanese-Nigerian commerce and politics will continue to intertwine, and how patterns of migration between Nigeria and Lebanon will evolve⎈

shop the republic

BUY THE MAGAZINE AND/OR THE COVER