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The Unresolved Questions of the Sahel Crisis

August/September 2024
Sahel Crisis

(L-R) Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, Mali’s Assimi Goita, and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore. Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

the ministry of world affairs

The Unresolved Questions of the Sahel Crisis

The formation of the Sahel Alliance has raised several questions, especially: is it really the worst thing in the world that three African military leaders want to rid their countries of neocolonialism and French imperialism?
Sahel Crisis

(L-R) Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, Mali’s Assimi Goita, and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore. Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

the ministry of world affairs

The Unresolved Questions of the Sahel Crisis

The formation of the Sahel Alliance has raised several questions, especially: is it really the worst thing in the world that three African military leaders want to rid their countries of neocolonialism and French imperialism?

In 2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) originated as a mutual defence pact between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in response to the threat of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the Niger coup. However, the mutual defence pact has since morphed into an alliance with a goal to pool resources, implement a monetary union and federalize into a sovereign state. Though initially motivated by a shared resistance to ECOWAS’s perceived neocolonial influence, the alliance represents a rejection of Western imposition in favour of a new narrative of self-determination and regional collaboration. The AES leaders interpreted ECOWAS’s military threats as not merely a challenge to their sovereignty, but also as an infringement upon the agency of the Sahelian people, who have longed for autonomy from external agendas that have historically undermined their governance.

Despite the creation of ECOWAS half a century ago, there is still an absence of institutionalized regional cooperation among West African countries. This is strikingly like the Middle East, where the struggle to find balance and equitable cooperation amidst persisting security dilemmas, competing economies, recurrent conflicts, and strong international influence continues. The recent decision by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to form the AES has raised several questions: What are the true intentions of the military leaders of these countries? Can their motives be questioned when they claim to resist meddling in their sovereign affairs? What does the alliance with the Russia Africa Corps/Wagner group (and by extension, Russia) mean for weapons trade in combating religious extremism? How will the power vacuum created by the departure of French and American peacekeepers affect the region? Is ECOWAS’ call for a return to constitutional/democratic governance the right move for citizens of these countries? Further, is ECOWAS’s current strategy of issuing ultimatums and threatening military action effective in negotiating a return? In examining these questions, it is essential to consider the complexities of regional cooperation, state failure, and international intervention in the Sahel region.

MUTUAL THREATS

It is reasonable to assume that if a group of actors form an alliance, it is likely they have a mutual enemy or threat or common goal. However, with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, there are multiple threats—and this is where the plot begins to thicken.

It is not news that religious extremists (i.e., Islamic State groups) have largely moved base operations from the Middle East to the Sahel region. So, a joint effort to combat domestic terrorism could be classified as ‘threat one’. But a majority of these three countries also happen to still speak the language of their colonizers and use the CFA Franc. Users of the French-backed currency adopted following colonialism are contractually obligated to adhere to certain monetary policies that keep them beholden to Paris. This includes the requirement of the Central Bank of West African States and the Bank of Central African States to deposit 50 per cent of their foreign exchange reserves in a French treasury operating account.

As countries in the Sahel express a desire for sovereignty and self-determination, citizens increasingly frame the CFA Franc and its connection to French colonial history as tools of neocolonial exploitation. The notion that these nations are still bound to a currency that not only embodies this painful past but also carries French financial oversight strikes at the heart of the national psyche. Manifestations of this sentiment were vividly illustrated during the protests that erupted in Mali. These gatherings were not merely a reaction to economic policies; they were fuelled by a collective frustration over being subject to decisions made in Paris that directly affect their households and livelihoods. This makes the CFA Franc in its symbolic and practical form, as well as the country that legitimizes it (France)—‘threat two’.

But ‘threat three’ is a little trickier because it is a little more difficult to verify. All three countries (in addition to some of its neighbours) have accused some of their democratically elected presidents of kowtowing to the will of French leaders, and in doing so, preventing millions of citizens from truly being able to determine their future. This sentiment became palpable in the protests in Niger, where widespread protests erupted against President Mohamed Bazoum following allegations of his government’s alignment with French interests in security matters. His administration’s perceived capitulation to French demands alienated many citizens, who framed the security strategies as contributing to their lack of agency. These protests not only called for the resignation of Bazoum but also articulated a deeper desire for governments that are more reflective of and accountable to their citizens. Hence, ineffective leadership would be ‘threat three’.

As citizens become increasingly frustrated with a system they view as unresponsive, public trust erodes, leading to a cycle of disengagement. This sense of betrayal can spur a more radical approach among segments of society, potentially pushing them towards extremist ideologies as promised solutions from leadership fail to materialize. Every day, citizens are caught in the crosshairs of these evolving dynamics, as they grapple with the compounded effects of economic hardship, political instability, and the yearning for genuine liberation from both external and internal oppressive forces. So, is it really the worst thing in the world that three African military leaders want to rid their countries of neocolonialism and French imperialism?

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FRAMING THE NARRATIVE

A preponderance of discourse surrounding the announcement of the AES and its withdrawal from ECOWAS reports the narrative in a zero-sum manner. That is, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso military leaders are not to be trusted, and the fact that they are breaking up with the West and teaming up with the East spells doom for everyone who cares about humanity. However, history has shown us that alliances are not that cut and dry.

The example of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) boycotting Qatar in 2017 due to Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism (in Iran) demonstrates that alternative patterns of regional cooperation against shared rivals can be possible. While Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are predominantly Sunni Muslim states, Egypt’s complex relationship with both Sunni Islam and its own political landscape adds layers to the alliance. Historically, these countries have diverged significantly in their approaches to governance, societal issues, and foreign policy priorities. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s leadership has focused on a more conservative interpretation of Islam, while Egypt, under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has taken a more secular approach, particularly after the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. Despite their distinct national interests and conflicting ideologies, these nations were willing to unite against their perceived common threat. The coalition emphasized how regional security concerns could overshadow long-standing rivalries and fears, leading to an unusual, albeit fragile, partnership motivated by the immediate goal of containing Iran’s influence and perceived threats.

From this perspective, loose, temporary security alignments may be more suitable in combating rivals than established institutions. The turbulent past between Egypt and Saudi Arabia serves as a reminder that relationships between regional powers can be complex and multifaceted. The alliance between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger makes sense given their shared struggles against insurgency.

However, the messaging from the alliance leaders has extended beyond the need for military support. Their position is that France has eroded the sovereignty of several African countries (vis-à-vis use of the CFA Franc and unfavourable natural resource exploitation deals, to name a few tactics) to keep them impoverished and to the benefit of the European country. Per a 2023 AP report, the Nigerien Foreign Ministry had expressed this sentiment in an expulsion letter to former French ambassador, Sylvain Itte, wherein it reasoned that ‘actions of the French government contrary to the interests of Niger,’ formed a part of the rationale for the expulsion. Further, in a February 2024 interview on Niger state television, the head of the Niger junta, Abdourahamane Tiani, proclaimed that abandoning the CFA franc would be a sign of sovereignty and a necessary step in moving away from French colonization.

Therefore, AES’s messaging supports a shared goal of attaining self-determination by cutting ties with foreign stakeholders and pooling resources among themselves. However, AES views ECOWAS as a foreign-dominated body that carries out the bidding of Western powers and as such, any calls for a return to constitutional governance undermines that position and neglects the irony of the sanctions. Further, the feasibility of that strategy is threatened by the ongoing domestic terrorism that must be combatted. The persistent insecurity requires resources to replace the ecosystem of external forces that have created a patch-fix security protection system for the region.

It was no surprise that the approach that AES took with finding a new partner to combat terrorism was to be open to all options. After all, the right to self-determine does not preclude voluntary partnerships with either the West or East. However, the AES’s decision to strengthen military cooperation with the Russia Africa Corps (successor entity to the Wagner Group) raises concerns about expanding Russian political and economic influence in the region. Since October 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have signed agreements for nuclear power cooperation to bolster security against terrorism. The Malian government also signed several agreements with the Russian government on gas, lithium, oil, and uranium exploration in Mali which analysts speculate will also allow Russia to expand its footprint in the region. Further, it is well documented that the use of and alliances with Private Military Companies can come with human rights violations. If AES leaders are purposely overlooking alleged Russia’s foreign policy objectives (i.e., to use Africa as a proxy to exert supremacy over the West and prove to Russian citizens that the Kremlin is not the big bad wolf) in favour of the immediate benefits it would provide or if they see the Russian gains simply as a by-product of the alliance, then that is their risk to assume. However, ECOWAS and its allies appear to not only be criticizing the alliance but also the legitimacy of the military regime to seize power and make such decisions.

It appears that support for democracy across the continent is waning. Though Africans prefer democratic governance than many parts of the world, the percentage of support for democracy in some of the continent’s most stable regions (for example, Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa) has fallen in the last few years alongside an increase in protests against tax increases, subsidy removals and corrupt governance. Thus, more young people are likely to support military rule due to frustration with poor democratic governance—and may be feeling the same sentiments felt in the 1990s when military rule was seen as a breath of disciplined fresh air to clean up the rot in democratic leadership.

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AT ODDS WITH ECOWAS

The Sahel alliance being viewed as a threat by ECOWAS is consistent with the historical approach of ECOWAS: oppose coups that overthrow democratically elected governments and impose sanctions alongside military involvement when autocratic leaders persist. However, the success rate of this strategy has been poor, especially in the last four years.

While ECOWAS suffers from constraints such as an inability to enforce legislation, legal verdicts, or sanctions, it has arguably been hypocritical in speaking out or acting when elected civilian leaders bend the rules and change constitutions to prolong their stay in office. In Togo, President Faure Gnassingbé faced widespread protests after he attempted to extend his presidency through constitutional changes, which ultimately maintained his rule since 2005. Similarly, in Guinea, President Alpha Condé pushed through a controversial constitutional referendum in 2020, allowing him to run for a third term despite widespread dissent and allegations of electoral fraud. In Benin, President Patrice Talon’s administration implemented electoral reforms that critics argue unfairly disadvantaged opposition parties, enabling his re-election in a process deemed undemocratic by many observers. These cases highlight a troubling pattern wherein ECOWAS has often been slow to respond or take decisive action against democratic backslidings and appears to be more concerned with the appearance of a democracy than a true expression of the will of most citizens.

Furthermore, ECOWAS is currently chaired by Nigeria’s President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, whose election into office in 2023 was marred by organized violence, underrepresentation of marginalized groups and the inability of Nigeria’s electoral commission to guarantee a transparent and inclusive democratic process. As a result, it is tempting to read the objective stated in Article 3 of the ECOWAS treaty—promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each member state—as empty words.

The mere fact that a country has a constitution that says it is democratic and whose head of state is a president or prime minister and not a military general does not mean its citizens have rights to organize, protest, recall their electives or exercise their rights to vote without violence. Granted, in the past, Nigeria has had leadership roles in conflict management. Its involvement in dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa, for instance, showcased its commitment to championing human rights and fostering regional stability. Further, during the Sierra Leone crisis in the late 1990s, Nigeria led the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces, demonstrating its capacity to mobilize resources and personnel to restore peace in the war-torn nation. However, Tunde Olatunji of The Africa Center contends that a lot of the ability to project strength and influence abroad must come from within, and over the last two decades, Nigeria has become less of an exceptional country and political and economic juggernaut to lead peace-keeping and reconciliatory missions. Olatunji noted that the challenges within Nigeria’s own political landscape are undermining its credibility and effectiveness as a leader in regional governance. Without genuine democratic practices at home, Nigeria’s capacity to champion democratic values and support the stabilization of its neighbours remains severely compromised.

So, it is not a shock that the AES balked at ECOWAS’s economic sanctions. From their perspective, ECOWAS and its participating countries who claim to be democracies within ECOWAS are not only being hypocritical in their call for the AES to return to democracy. They are also losing the moral standing from which to make democracy the prevailing political ideology to be spread across Africa, by virtue of their poor governance and illusion of democracy. After all, what use is a democracy if leaders implement policy advice from external stakeholders because they have their hand out for financial assistance or if the institutions of democracy are only built to fulfil the self-interest of the ruling elite? From the perspective of AES leadership and military regime supporters, illegitimate African elections are no better than no elections.

For ECOWAS to avoid further hypocrisy, it must intervene solely based on human rights concerns and the potential risks of instability spilling into ECOWAS or other African countries. However, such intervention requires great care and deliberation. To negotiate effectively, ECOWAS must acknowledge the rationale behind the coups as legitimate, transparently address its own shortcomings, clarify its interests in the conflict and be careful to not be presumed to be touting the same message as the West.

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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As the AES continues to navigate the complex landscape of regional cooperation and state failure, it is essential to recognize that the path forward is not a binary choice between East and West or democracy and autocracy. Instead, it is a nuanced balancing act that requires African countries to define and prioritize their own self-determination while also acknowledging the global implications of their actions. The AES’s decision to forge a military and economic alliance between themselves and Russia, despite the risks and uncertainties, serves as a reminder that African countries are not required to have the same foreign policies and styles of diplomacy. However, this newfound independence must be accompanied by a commitment to democratic values and human rights, lest it perpetuate the same cycles of authoritarianism and corruption that have plagued the continent for so long.

The crisis in the Sahel region highlights the need for a fundamental shift in our approach to international relations. Rather than relying on permanent alliances and institutions, we must recognize that regional cooperation is often temporary and context-dependent. The AES’s decision to withdraw from ECOWAS is not a rejection of regional cooperation per se, but rather a recognition that the institution’s failure to address the root causes of instability and conflict has created an environment in which temporary security arrangements are necessary. This underscores the importance of building flexible and adaptive regional frameworks that can respond to changing circumstances and priorities.

Ultimately, the future of African relations depends on our ability to navigate these complexities with nuance and foresight. It requires leaders who are willing to listen to their people, prioritize their needs, and make difficult choices about how to balance competing interests. As we move forward, it is essential that we prioritize building trust and fostering dialogue between African countries, rather than imposing pre-made ideologies or seeking to impose a certain brand of governance over others. By doing so, we can create a more just and equitable international order that reflects the diversity and complexity of African countries’ interests⎈

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