The second element to interrogate is Angola’s perspective. What does Angola’s decision mean, and why has it come to pass now? President João Lourenço of Angola, having succeeded dos Santos after his 37-year tenure in 2017, has seasoned a rhetoric that is pro-rule of law and anti-corruption. President Lourenço presents Angola as an open country that respects the constitution and the law. This is an image that is difficult to maintain, given that such respect and even formal legislation are often not followed in practice. Indeed, at the level of the Angolan judiciary, this is a time of disconsolation: with daily allegations of corruption against the president of the Supreme Court, and a judiciary that is not considered by public opinion to be independent and impartial. 

To this extent, Angola’s ratification of the Malabo Protocol is not entirely surprising—coming from a political power that, domestically, has allowed the courts to degrade its image and functionality. This behaviour reflects an element of schizophrenia and is characteristic of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party. The MPLA has enjoyed uninterrupted power since independence in 1975, having begun as a pro-Soviet Marxist movement before joining the Socialist International. It now has no discernible ideology. This shrewd accommodation on the part of the MPLA provokes a double discourse: in theory promising something similar to that which a modern democratic party would promote, but in practice maintaining premises that incline towards authoritarianism. 

President Lourenço has exemplified this structural ambiguity. While he appears to want to open up Angola, modernize its economy, and combat corruption, he is caught up in hesitations, contradictions, setbacks and advances, which sometimes earn him more heated criticism than his predecessor, dos Santos. 

It is in this political context that this ratification arises. It is primarily intended as a gesture of Angola’s commitment to the rule of law, but in concrete terms does not signify any progress with respect to better adjudication regarding human rights and the crimes categorized in the Malabo Protocol. It will therefore essentially be a question of image. 

Lourenço is already in his second term as Angola’s president and is constitutionally prohibited from holding any further terms. It currently appears unlikely that he can aim for a constitutional amendment that would grant him a third term, which, curiously, might already be considered a crime in light of the Malabo Protocol, which prohibits unconstitutional changes of government. 

In view of this constitutional fact and considering the immense appetite for the international arena that Lourenço has exhibited, it is highly likely that this ratification, which places Angola at the forefront of the continent, is a gesture aimed at elevating the President’s regional and international posture. An image as a continental trailblazer on the rule of law will chime well in New York, at the headquarters of the United Nations, and in many other international organizations. 

Yet irrespective of its motivations, Angola has fulfilled its role in paving the way for the creation of a true international African court. To further concretize this gesture, it would be advisable for Angola to make the declaration required by Article 9.3 to ‘accept the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 30(f).’ This, crucially, would enable civil society to participate in court proceedings and submit cases. While Angola’s ratification of the Malabo Protocol is a small step steeped in structural and political complexities, the ratification remains an important symbol that portends positively for the realization of true African-driven international criminal justice⎈