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Tinubu and West Africa’s Growing Coup Belt

AfricaJune/July 2024
Tinubu Coup Belt

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid for THE REPUBLIC.

the ministry of international affairs

Tinubu and West Africa’s Growing Coup Belt

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election as ECOWAS chairman shines light on his first geo-political test which is the handling of the recent coups in West Africa, a situation that can make or mar Nigeria’s foreign policy record.
Tinubu Coup Belt

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid for THE REPUBLIC.

the ministry of international affairs

Tinubu and West Africa’s Growing Coup Belt

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election as ECOWAS chairman shines light on his first geo-political test which is the handling of the recent coups in West Africa, a situation that can make or mar Nigeria’s foreign policy record.

In early August 2023, people on the streets of Niger staged protests against Nigeria’s leader, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. The protesters bore placards that carried the phrase ‘Ebola Tinubu’. It was a reaction to the Nigerian president’s response to a coup that had been successfully staged in the previous month. Niger was the latest country to join a three-year resurgence of coups in the Sahel, and subsequently pulled out of the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Nigeria responded with various measures including, cutting the power supply to the country as well as the threat of military intervention. Support for the latter was weak in both Nigeria and Niger. Almost a year since the coup was staged, Niger remains under military rule. How did external perceptions about President Tinubu’s rise to power affect Nigeria’s ability to respond to the overthrowing of democracy in a neighbouring state that it has had a long and influential relationship with? What can we expect from President Tinubu as leader of the most powerful country in West Africa and ECOWAS’s current chairman? What does the future look like for democracy in a region where other countries not under military rule are characterized by the same challenges that contributed to coups in the region?

THE COUP IN NIGER

On 27 July 2023, a colonel-major of the Nigerien Air Force, Amadou Abdramane, announced on state television that the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, had been overthrown. Niger’s military, specifically members of its presidential guard had detained the country’s president and claimed power, forming what it called a National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland. The coup, or ‘crisis’, ‘serious event’ or ‘military misbehaviour’ (depending on who was referring to it) drew different reactions from the region and internationally. Niger had joined a band of other Sahelian states like Mali and Burkina Faso, which had already had successful coups and Niger’s coup leaders engaged the leadership in Bamako and Ouagadougou for support even as other countries and bodies condemned it, demanding a restoration of civilian rule in the country.

Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu had earlier in that month emerged as ECOWAS’s new chairman (He was re-elected for a second term on 7 July 2024). Part of his remarks included a strong stance on security issues in the region, naming both terrorism and the rise of military takeovers. In his words, ‘We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without Democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in West Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.’ It was essentially a call for member states to support democracy and political stability in the subregion. However, the coup in Niger was the first challenge to this stance.

On 30 of July 2023, ECOWAS formally responded to the situation, giving a one-week ultimatum that required the Nigerien military to give up power or be faced with sanctions and possible military response. The ultimatum was clear in its messaging that a peaceful resolution was the priority and the preferred alternative to force.

WHAT ECOWAS DISHED

According to Article 45 of the Protocol on Conflict, in the event of an abrupt end to democracy or ‘massive violation of human rights’ in a member state, ECOWAS can impose sanctions, suspend the erring state, encourage the return to constitutional order in the state, or more directly, support the restoration of political authority in conjunction with relevant regional and international organizations.

ECOWAS placed a number of sanctions on Niger, ranging from a no-fly zone to freezing the assets of those involved in the coup. As ECOWAS is an organization built to foster economic growth through cooperation and integration amongst member states, this meant that sanctions affected both Niger as well as other countries it had strong ties with. Like Nigeria.

Border closures and a tense relationship for one meant that the security situation starring jihadists and insurgents, which gave birth to the Multinational Joint Task Force (that includes Niger and Nigeria), was adversely affected. Nigeria and Niger have cooperated in fighting insecurity across their borders for years and in tackling a number of cross-border issues like trafficking and crime. Also, over 300,000 Nigerian refugees are present in Niger, having fled insecurity in northeast Nigeria. Then there’s also the legal economic activity marked by trade between both countries and collaboration on a number of subregional projects like the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which was proposed as an economic opportunity for four African states, including Nigeria and Niger, to supply Europe with gas.

When the sanctions hit, they affected both Nigeriens and Nigerians. Experts called for review of the sanctions, arguing that the sanctions were having adverse effects on Nigeriens (including Nigerians in Niger) while failing to achieve their main goal of getting the junta to return power to President Bazoum. Niger gets two-thirds of its electricity supply from Nigeria, and that supply was cut off. Countries closing their borders with Niger blocked the exchange of goods between countries, including essentials like food, in a country that was already facing a food crisis before the coup. A senior adviser on Nigeria to the International Crisis Group,  Nnamdi Obasi, in a call to recalibrate the situation, stated that it would be better if the sanctions being enforced were limited to policies that affected the junta directly (travel bans, assets freezes etc) and recommended that those affecting the lives and livelihoods of ordinary citizens were lifted.

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THE PROBLEM WITH ECOWAS’s RESPONSE

Niger’s military in a state broadcast identified ‘rising insecurity and government incompetence’ as major triggers of the coup. These issues are not unique to Niger but are prevalent across several ECOWAS member states. A significant criticism of ECOWAS lies in the discrepancy between its stated democratic principles and the actual governance practices within its member states.

Amongst ECOWAS’s membership are countries with governments that amended constitutions to allow for longer terms in office. For example, Togo in April 2024 signed new electoral reforms into law that will take it from a presidential to a parliamentary system, cancelling direct elections for the office of president. Experts argued that it will allow President Faure Gnassingbé, who came into office in 2005 after succeeding his father who became president in 1967, to stay in office until 2031. It also includes countries with governments that have seen popular uprisings against them, and governments that came into power after questionable elections such as Côte d’Ivoire. The Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, adopted by ECOWAS in 2001, is regarded as the guiding mechanism for these issues and outlines a number of principles by which governments must abide. They include the stipulation that accession to power must be by free, fair and transparent elections and zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means. It touches on several areas like elections, human and democratic rights, poverty alleviation, the role of the armed forces, corruption and even student exchange.

So, the failure of governments to abide by the principles ECOWAS has set is a core reason not just for the rise of coups in West Africa, but also for the popular support they appear to be getting in states where we generally assume democracy would be the popular wish of citizens, at least as a preference over military rule. The underlying problem within ECOWAS is its inability to enforce its own standards effectively, leading to a credibility gap. This gap undermines its authority and hampers its efforts to counter regional coup issues. The organization’s response to these issues has sometimes been inconsistent and ineffective, particularly in its inability to prevent the consolidation of power by military leaders and the long-term delays in transitions back to civilian rule. While ECOWAS has imposed sanctions and engaged in diplomatic efforts, these actions have not always led to the restoration of democratic governance.

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NIGERIA’S RESPONSE

President Tinubu’s response condemning the coup was not out of place, considering the standards set by the organization. However, it was bedevilled both by stated old problems within the organization and the newish problem of lack of support, fuelled by perceptions of illegitimacy, in the nation leading the charge.

Nigeria’s 2023 elections for many marked a turning point as reflected in the amount of chatter on social media. Social media was abuzz in the months leading up to the election, as well as during and after its conduct. It reflected reawakened political participation on the ground, especially amongst Nigeria’s youth. The results of the elections were contested by the newly popular Labour Party (LP) and the old main opposition party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), with many questioning the process that led to the declaration and inauguration of Tinubu as president. As of July 2023 (when the coup in Niger happened), the presidential election tribunal set up to investigate and rule on allegations of irregularities and malpractice was still on. In that month, PDP and LP made their closing arguments on the case with the latter calling the tribunal to nullify the president’s victory based on an argument that the president was not qualified to contest the election and that the country’s electoral body had wrongly declared him president.

Ovigwe Eguegu, a policy analyst working for an international development consultancy, told me that there was a lot of speculation that Nigeria’s strong stance against the military takeover in Niger was because a lot of people in Nigeria doubted the credibility of Nigeria’s presidential election. According to Eguegu, ‘people interpreted the (Nigeria’s) firm stance as a way to discourage any ideas of a military takeover at home in Nigeria.’

While seeking answers to the situation in Niger questions over Nigeria’s democracy lingered. Perceptions about President Tinubu’s rise to power, marked by allegations of electoral irregularities and legitimacy issues, weakened his domestic and international standing. This undermined Nigeria’s moral authority and diplomatic leverage in responding to the coup in Niger. The measures from a Nigeria-led ECOWAS were met with resistance and scepticism both domestically and in Niger. The protests and derogatory placards reflected distrust and discontent, not just with Nigeria’s external actions but also with its internal political dynamics. One can argue that Tinubu’s contested legitimacy at the time impaired Nigeria’s ability to effectively lead a coordinated regional response to the coup.

On a more ‘official’ or organized government front, the sanctions on Niger did not have the desired effect. The country, though suspended from ECOWAS, was not alone as it had joined the ranks of other African states that had come under military rule in the last five years. Niger’s officials’ visits to Mali and Burkina Faso found support there as the newest addition to the so-called ‘coup belt’. It seems the success of the coups in those countries served as inspiration for Niger’s coup.

By January 2024, these three states announced that they would be leaving ECOWAS as they had already been suspended because of the coups. They declared an Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States, AES), a mutual defence pact to discourage or respond to an attack on any of its members.

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE WEST AFRICA?

In February 2024, sanctions on AES states were lifted in a move seen as a means to facilitate dialogue that would bring them back into the fold. The junta in Niger didn’t step down under the weight of sanctions. Usually, one of the things states rely on with the imposition of sanctions is that the great discomfort within a country will be pinned on the government, causing it to lose any support it already had, and that the force of both internal and external pressures will cause the government’s will to bend, or break.

It doesn’t always go as planned, including in this case. Nigeriens not only supported the coup (at least in its infancy), they also found a common enemy to rally against; a big bad ECOWAS, under the influence of Western powers, threatening their security, sovereignty and perhaps freedom.

Again, the sanctions didn’t exactly work, raising concerns about other states joining the coup belt if the coup contagion theory holds true. It largely exposes the great faults in West Africa and the continent. Legitimacy in this case extends from the acceptance of the earned right of a president to rule a country to West African states attempting to hold each other to ideals that they do not always abide by at home. ECOWAS has faced criticism for a constellation of leaders who though not in khaki have often gone to great lengths to ensure their indefinite stay in power, including amending national constitutions.

Eguegu argues that fundamentally, while ECOWAS under Tinubu was firm on the issue of democracy, Nigeria and ECOWAS’s policy has not been a success. Eguegu said:

One year ago, ECOWAS was a community of 15 members. Today, it’s still not clear whether the Alliance of Sahel states will walk back on their decision and announcement to exit ECOWAS or whether they will move ahead with it. Beyond the possible fracture, the stated aim which is to complete Niger and other juntas to return to democracy has not been achieved. So, ECOWAS is weaker today than it was one year ago.

With the government of Burkina Faso announcing in May 2024 that it will be extending military rule in the country by five years, the future of democracy in West Africa becomes more uncertain.

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WHAT NEXT?

As the president of Nigeria and ECOWAS’s current chairman, Tinubu is expected to navigate complex political terrains both within Nigeria and across West Africa. How these events play out can be viewed as a challenge to Nigeria’s position as a regional leader, an opportunity, or both.

Opportunity means the president can strive to reinforce Nigeria’s role as a regional power by focusing on diplomatic engagements, seeking to build consensus among ECOWAS members, and advocating for democratic principles. His effectiveness will likely be constrained by domestic (political) challenges and the varying interests of ECOWAS member states.

According to Eguegu, the expectation that democratization leads to improvements in poverty, underdevelopment, and quality of life has not been met in the Sahel region. He makes an example of Burkina Faso, where after the ousting of its former president, Blaise Compaoré in 2014, the country transitioned to democracy but saw no improvement in its security situation and even lost control of 40 per cent of its territory. This instability led to successive coups. He said:

Overall development is still poor in many of these countries that were democratic. Yes, democracy was not entrenched out there for very long, but nobody really felt the difference in most cases. So that is not an indictment on democracy, but lots of people feel and think that democracy is not delivering as quickly or as powerfully as they expected from a quality-of-life perspective.

It is somewhat clear that democracy as practised in West Africa is not working as it should. How states go about addressing this problem will largely determine whether democracy prevails in the region and in what shape. It is a point for deep reflection and perhaps a call to innovate… or die⎈

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